LLM Application Security Assessment
Security assessment for LLM-powered applications including prompt engineering risks and integration vulnerabilities
Our LLM Application Security Assessment tests an application that embeds a large language model — not the model in isolation, but the whole chain around it: the prompts, the retrieved context and RAG data, the tools the model can call, the way its output is trusted downstream, and the boundaries between users. An LLM adds a new attack surface on top of ordinary application security, so we test both. The work follows the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications and the OWASP AI Testing Guide, and draws on MITRE ATLAS and the NIST AI Risk Management Framework. Every finding is proven with a reproducible case, rated with CVSS alongside its real impact, and written up with a concrete fix.
What's Included
Direct prompt injection and jailbreak testing against the application's guardrails
Indirect prompt injection through retrieved content, documents, and RAG sources
Improper output handling: model output that reaches HTML, SQL, a shell, or another system unescaped
Sensitive information disclosure: training data, system context, secrets, and other users' data
System prompt and instruction leakage
Excessive agency: over-broad tools, plugins, and actions the model can trigger
Vector and embedding weaknesses: retrieval of unauthorized documents and RAG data poisoning
Authentication, authorization, and tenant isolation between users of the model
Unbounded consumption: cost and denial-of-service through unrestricted prompts
Supply-chain and provider review: model, plugins, and where prompts and outputs travel
How It Works
- Executive summary with a risk overview for decision-makers
- Detailed technical report, each finding with a reproducible proof of concept
- Prompt-injection and jailbreak findings, direct and indirect
- Output-handling and downstream-trust findings with concrete fixes
- Data-access, tenant-isolation, and agency findings
- Findings mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications, with CVSS and business impact
- Prioritized remediation guidance for the application and its guardrails
- Re-testing after remediation
Why HafezSecure
Frequently Asked Questions
It evaluates an application that embeds a large language model — testing prompt injection (direct and indirect), improper output handling, sensitive information disclosure, excessive agency, RAG and embedding weaknesses, tenant isolation, and unbounded consumption — following the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications and the OWASP AI Testing Guide, with each finding proven and rated.
A model assessment looks at the model itself — its behavior, its robustness, its training and alignment. An application assessment looks at how a model is wired into a product: the prompts, the tools, the retrieval, the output handling, and the access controls around it. Most real-world risk lives in the application layer, which is what this service tests.
It is an attack where the malicious instruction is not typed by the attacker into the chat, but hidden in content the model later reads — a document, a web page, an email, or a RAG source. When the model retrieves that content, it follows the injected instruction as if it were a legitimate one. It is dangerous because the victim is the model's own trusted data path.
Yes. We test whether retrieval respects the user's permissions (so one user cannot retrieve another's documents), whether the RAG source can be poisoned to steer the model, and whether embedded content can carry an indirect injection. Retrieval is one of the most common places an LLM application leaks data.
Excessive agency is when the model can call tools or take actions broader than the task needs — delete records, send messages, make purchases, reach internal systems. If an injection can steer the model, that agency becomes the attacker's. We check that tools are scoped to least privilege and that high-impact actions require a human check.
We map where prompts and outputs travel — what is logged, what is sent to a third-party provider, and what leaves your boundary — and flag it as part of the assessment. During testing we use scoped, non-sensitive data where possible and agree in advance what may be used, so the test itself does not create exposure.
Many tests are read-only conversations and are safe. Tests that could trigger a tool or an action — a purchase, a message, a deletion — are agreed in advance and run carefully; we prefer a staging environment that mirrors production, and when we must test production we set limits and keep a contact on your side to pause at once.
Each finding gets a CVSS score for a common baseline, adjusted by the real impact — what data or action it reaches, how easily, and whether it crosses a user or tenant boundary — and is mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications. That is why two issues with the same score can be prioritized differently.
Duration depends on the application's complexity — the number of tools, the RAG sources, and the user roles. A typical assessment runs about two to four weeks, and we give a firm estimate after scoping. Re-testing after you remediate is included, to confirm each fix holds.
Related Services
Complementary services that might be useful for you
Related insights
What we have written about this service