LLM Model Security Assessment
Security assessment of Large Language Models including prompt injection, model extraction, and training data leakage
Our LLM Model Security Assessment tests a large language model at the level of the model itself — its weights, its behavior, and the endpoint that serves it — rather than the application wrapped around it. We test whether the model can be pushed past its safety training (jailbreak and adversarial inputs), whether it discloses sensitive information or the data it was trained on, whether it can be copied or its parameters recovered (model extraction and theft), and whether it stands up to poisoning and malformed input. Because a safety filter tuned for English can be slipped with Persian character variants and mixed script that leave the model's understanding intact, we test the language-specific evasions too. The work follows the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications and the OWASP AI Testing Guide, and draws on MITRE ATLAS. Every finding is proven, rated with CVSS alongside its real impact, and written up with a concrete fix.
What's Included
Jailbreak and safety-training bypass: pushing the model past the behavior it was trained to refuse
Direct and indirect prompt injection against the model
Language-specific evasion: character variants, zero-width characters, and mixed-script obfuscation in Persian
Sensitive information disclosure, including memorized training data
Model extraction and model theft through the inference endpoint
Membership inference: whether a given record was in the training data
Adversarial input and robustness under malformed or crafted prompts
Data and model poisoning exposure, where the training or fine-tuning path is in scope
Insecure output handling where the model's output reaches another system
Unbounded consumption and model denial-of-service
Deployment and configuration review of the model endpoint
How It Works
- Executive summary with a risk overview for decision-makers
- Detailed technical report, each finding with a reproducible case
- Jailbreak, prompt-injection, and language-specific evasion findings
- Information-disclosure and training-data leakage findings
- Model-extraction, model-theft, and membership-inference findings
- Robustness, output-handling, and endpoint deployment findings
- Findings mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications, with CVSS and business impact
- Prioritized remediation guidance and re-testing after remediation
Why HafezSecure
Frequently Asked Questions
It tests a large language model at the level of the model and its endpoint — jailbreak and safety-training bypass, prompt injection, information disclosure and training-data leakage, model extraction and theft, adversarial robustness, and deployment security — following the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications and the OWASP AI Testing Guide, with each finding proven and rated.
An application assessment tests the whole product built around a model — its prompts, its data sources, its integrations, and the app's own auth. A model assessment tests the model itself: its safety training, what it has memorized, and whether it can be copied. Teams that host or fine-tune their own model need the model-level view; teams that only consume a model through an app usually start with the application assessment.
Jailbreak is getting the model to ignore its own safety rules — to produce what it was trained to refuse. Prompt injection is getting it to follow an attacker's instruction over the one it was given, often through content it reads. They overlap, and a model assessment tests both.
At minimum, access to the model endpoint and its interface. Where the model is self-hosted, access to the weights, the deployment configuration, and any fine-tuning or training path (a white-box view) lets us test extraction, memorization, and poisoning far more thoroughly. We scope the depth of access with you before we start.
All three. Black-box reaches the model only through its endpoint, white-box works from the weights and deployment configuration, and grey-box sits in between. Extraction and robustness are meaningful in black-box; memorization, poisoning, and deployment findings need the deeper access, so we match the mode to the questions that matter to you.
A staging deployment that mirrors production is preferred, because extraction and denial-of-service testing send a high volume of queries. Where we test against production, we agree on rate and boundary limits first, so the live service is not disrupted.
Each finding is scored with CVSS and presented next to its real impact, so a curiosity is not mistaken for a leak of sensitive data or a practical path to copying the model. That pairing is what lets you fix in the right order.
Yes. Re-testing after remediation is part of the engagement: we confirm each fix actually closes the issue and did not weaken the model elsewhere, and the report is updated to reflect the remediated state.
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